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Abstract: In the present paper we will discuss the following problem: Is the
external reality primarily a quantum world such that in macroscopic dimensions
classical properties evolve by decoherence and emergency?  Or is there only
a classical, macroscopic world of apparatuses and observers, and what we can
say about the quantum world is nothing but a consistent way of speaking which
illustrates without any ontological commitments merely the formalism of quantum
mechanics?
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1 The quantum logic approach
The main goal of the quantum logic approach is the bottom-top reconstruction
of Hilbert lattices and of quantum mechanics in Hilbert space  and that without
any reference to the actual historical development of this theory. Starting from
a weak quantum ontology O(Q), that can be obtained from classical ontology
O(C) by eliminating some metaphysical hypotheses (Mittelstaedt 2005), we can
construct a formal language SQ of quantum physics whose syntax leads in some
formal steps to the calculus LQ of quantum logic. The Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra
of SQ turns out to be a complete, orthomodular lattice LQ. If the language refers
to a single system, the lattice is atomic and fulﬁlls the covering law. It will be
denoted here by L∗Q. Using the Piron-McLaren theorem and the angle-bisecting
condition of Solèr, we arrive at the Hilbert lattice LH , the classical Hilbert spaces
and the well-known quantum mechanics in Hilbert space. It should be mentioned,
that within this approach a realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics must
refer to the presupposed weak quantum ontology O(Q).
In Hilbert space quantum mechanics the most general observables are given by
POV-measures (Busch/Lahti/Mittelstaedt 1996), which correspond to unsharp
properties. Hence in order to make the result of the quantum logic approach
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compatible with the underlying ontology we should replace the quantum ontology
O(Q) by a more general ontology O(Qu) of unsharp properties. In this ontology,
two unsharp properties can be attributed jointly to a system, provided the conve-
niently deﬁned degrees of unsharpness satisfy the uncertainty relation. Hence the
quantum ontology O(Qu) which replaces the strict complementarity requirement
by the more relaxed uncertainty principle is somewhat stronger than the original
ontology O(Q), but still weaker than the classical ontology O(C). More details
about this way of reasoning can be found in the literature (Mittelstaedt 2005).
There is still another point to be mentioned. If quantum mechanics is considered
to be universally valid, it is applicable to macroscopic as well as to microscopic
systems and in particular to the measurement apparatuses. It is well known, that
within the framework of quantum mechanics it is not possible after a unitary
premeasurement to attribute sharp or unsharp values to the pointer observable
(Busch/Lahti/Mittelstaedt 1996; Mittelstaedt 1998 and Busch 1998). Even if
merely unsharp values are attributed to the pointer, these values turn out to be
not strictly reliable.1 For macroscopic quantities, however, this unreliability is
practically negligible, and hence it was never observed. On the other side, we
should keep in mind that in quantum physics the requirement of objective and
reliable pointer values  the pointer objectiﬁcation postulate  is merely a reminis-
cence to classical physics. However, classical physics is based  at least partially 
on ontological hypotheses without any rational or empirical justiﬁcation. Hence,
there is in principle no reason to maintain the requirement of objectiﬁcation.
2 A new alternative approach to quantum me-
chanics
The alternative approach to quantum mechanics that we will brieﬂy discuss here,
was considered by its authors as a means to remove many conceptual problems
of quantum mechanics. We mention here in particular the work of Aage Bohr,
Mottelson, and Ulfbeck (Ulfbeck/Bohr 2001; Bohr/Mottelson/Ulfbeck 2004a and
Bohr/Mottelson/Ulfbeck 2004b) and several papers that are concerned with the
probability interpretation (e. g., Appleby 2005). Also the comment by Mermin
(2004) contains interesting information. The starting point of the new approach
is the almost trivial observation that we can perceive merely clicks in a detector
and that an individual click can in general not be determined by any law. Fur-
thermore, it is assumed that these entirely uncaused clicks are objective events
in space and time. Moreover, since we observe merely these undetermined click
events, there is no objective causality law that connects in an experimental set-
up the preparation with the registration. In addition, particles as carriers of
properties are merely imaginations and do not exist as real entities.
There is, however, still another point that must be contained in any new inter-
pretation of quantum mechanics. In addition to, and in spite of the objective
1 This means that . . . one cannot claim with certainty that the reading one means to have
taken is reproducible on a second look at the pointer (Busch 1998, p. 246).
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indeterminacy of single events, a large number of identically prepared and reg-
istered events fulﬁll the well known statistical laws of quantum mechanics. The
protagonists of the new approach argue that the clicks do not occur in pure
emptiness but in the context of counters and apparatuses, which provide the
classical background for the exploration of the click. It is then shown, that from
these weak premises together with some invariance requirements (e.g. Galileo
invariance), the statistical laws of quantum mechanics can be derived.
Summarizing the main results of this approach, Bohr/Mottelson/Ulfbeck (2004a)
emphasize the new principle of genuine fortuitousness which means that a single
click is entirely uncaused. There is no need to consider a click in the detector
as caused by a particle. The click has no cause and is recognized merely as a
macroscopic discontinuity. Hence, particles are completely eliminated.
3 Critical remarks
3.1 The constitution of objects
From a philosophical point of view the restriction of our knowledge to observed
qualities can be traced back to the writings of David Hume. In his Treatise of
Human Nature of 1739 Hume emphasized that we never observe objects directly
but only qualities and that it is nothing but imagination if we regard the observed
qualities as properties of an object. Consequently, within Hume's scepticism
against induction there is no reason to assume that objects  as ﬁctitious entities
obey some causal laws. However, on account of the same scepticism, Hume never
denied the existence of objects and of laws of nature. Only within the positivism
of the 19th century, Ernst Mach argued in a more antirealistic way and denied
explicitly the existence of atoms, since  at this time  atoms could not directly
be observed.
In contrast to Hume, Kant emphasized in the Critique of Pure Reason that objects
of experience are not arbitrary imaginations but entities that were constituted
from our observations by means of some conceptual prescriptions, the categories
of substance and causality. Kant formulated necessary conditions, which must be
fulﬁlled by the observed qualities if these qualities are considered as properties of
an object. We will not go into detail here, since the same way of reasoning was
also applied in physics during the last 50 years.
In classical mechanics in phase space as well as in quantum mechanics in Hilbert
space, we describe measurable quantities, observable properties and their tempo-
ral development, but not objects as carriers of properties that persist in time. In
both ﬁelds, classical physics and quantum physics, objects must be constituted
by formal methods, which might be considered as a reconstruction of the Kantian
way of reasoning. In quantum mechanics, we can argue as follows. If we are given
a convenient invariance group G, e.g. the Galileo group, a pointer observable Z
of the apparatus, and a pointer function f that connects pointer values Zi with
values f−1(Zi) of the measured observable (POV-measure), then we arrive at the
following result:
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Whenever the triple (G; Z; f ) fulﬁlls the requirements of a system of imprim-
itivity, then objects as persistent carriers of properties are given by convenient
representations of the symmetry group G (cf. Mackey 1963; Piron 1976; Mittel-
staedt 1995 and Mittelstaedt/Weingartner 2005, Ch. 10).
More explicitly this means, that the object values f−1(G[Zi]) of the G-transformed
pointer values Zi must agree with the G-transformed object-values G[f−1(Zi)] of
the pointer values Zi, i.e.
f−1(G[Zi]) = G[f−1(Zi)].
Since in the new alternative approach to quantum mechanics these possibilities to
constitute objects in an empiricist framework, are not considered at all, neither
in the sense of Kant's philosophy, nor in the sense of systems of imprimitivity,
the supposed new interpretation represents nothing but a crude antirealism in
the foundations of quantum mechanics.
3.2 Probability laws
The possibility, on the basis of completely undetermined single events, to derive
the quantum mechanical probability laws is neither new nor a merit of the antire-
alist approach mentioned. Originally, a result of this kind was obtained within
the framework of the many worlds interpretation by Everett (1957), Graham
(1973) and DeWitt (1971), within the context of quantum logic by Finkelstein
(1962), and within quantum cosmology by Hartle (1968). Within the framework
of contemporary quantum theory of measurement, various probability theorems
were proved, the most simple one reads:
Let ϕ be the preparation of a system, and A = ΣAi P(Ai) the measured observ-
able with eigenvalues Ai and projection operators P(Ai). If a unitary premea-
surement fulﬁlls the calibration postulate, then the relative frequency f(Ai) of
outcomes Ai is given in the limit of inﬁnitely many measurements of A by the
probability distribution p(ϕ, Ai) = (ϕ, P(Ai)ϕ), which depends on the prepara-
tion and the measures observable (Mittelstaedt 1991; Busch/Lahti/Mittelstaedt
1996; Gutmann 1995; Mittelstaedt 1998 and Mittelstaedt/Weingartner 2005).
It must be emphasized that this result holds if and only if the single measurement
outcomes are completely undetermined and do not depend on hidden individual
properties like a potentia (Heisenberg) or propensity (Popper). This means that
the quantum mechanical probability law p(ϕ, Ai) = (ϕ, P(Ai)ϕ) just reﬂects that
the individual events are not determined by any law. Hence, it is neither new
nor surprising that in the antirealist approach a probability law can be derived
for completely uncaused events. Obviously, this result has nothing to do with the
strange and antirealist philosophy of this approach.
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4 Conclusion
The arguments of the present paper lead to a two-fold result. On the one hand, if
we were starting from the ontology of the quantum world and proceed according
to the quantum logical way of reasoning, then we would arrive at quantum me-
chanics in Hilbert space. However, since this way does not lead to decoherence,
the classical world cannot be achieved or reconstructed in this way. On the other
hand, if we were starting from the classical world of apparatuses and observers,
we would not obtain causality of single events and hence no particles as bearers
of causally connected properties. What we obtain is an abstract scheme, a for-
malism for calculating probabilities, but not objects of a quantum world.
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